

Message Text

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EXDIS FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SONNENFELDT

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: DRAFT DALLAS SPEECH

1. FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL FOR THE DALLAS SPEECH ON DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY. THIS IS STILL VERY ROUGH AND WE WILL NEED TO DO A LOT MORE WORK ON IT. I WILL HAVE REVISED DRAFT BY THE TIME OF YOUR RETURN. WINSTON HAS A COPY OF THIS MATERIAL.

2. BEGIN TEXT: AMERICA IS STRONG. OUR STRENGTH STEMS FROM THE BOUNTY OF OUR RESOURCES, FROM THE INDUSTRIES AND FARMS WHICH HARNESS THESE RESOURCES, AND FROM OUR PEOPLE WHO WORK TOGETHER TO FORM THE SINEWS OF OUR STRENGTH.

3. ENTERING OUR THRID CENTURY WE FACE HEAVY RESPONSIBILI-
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TIES IN THE WORLD FROM WHICH THERE NO LONGER IS ESCAPE.

WE ARE ONE OF TWO NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS. TOGETHER WITH OUR

ALLIES WE ARE STRIVING TO BUILD A BETTER MEANS OF SECURING
INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM WHICH ALL NATIONS BENEFIT AND IN
WHICH ALL HAVE A STAKE.

4. THE ESSENCE OF A SOUND FOREIGN POLICY IS TO UNDERSTAND
THE CHANGES IN THE WORLD AND TO SO POSITION OURSELVES
THAT WE CAN RESIST AND MANAGE POSSIBLE ADVERSE CHANGES
AND MAXIMIZE THOSE THAT ARE FAVORABLE -- WHETHER POLITICAL,
PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL. TO DO THIS REQUIRES AN ADMIX-
TURE OF STRENGTH AND DECISIVENESS TEMPERED WITH WISDOM.
ABOVE ALL, IT REQUIRES A NEW CONSTANCY AND A RECOGNITION
THAT WE CAN NEITHER TURN OUR BACKS UPON THE WORLD NOR
MASTER ALL ITS PROBLEMS.

5. MUCH HAS BEEN HEARD OF LATE REGARDING THE INCREASE OF
SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH. AND IT IS A FACT THAT THE SOVIETS
CONTINUE TO SPEND MORE ON DEFENSE THAN DO WE, BOTH IN
ABSOLUTE TERMS AND AS A PROPORTION OF GNP. THEY HAVE
BECOME A NUCLEAR SUPERPOWER WITH STRONG CONVENTIONAL MILI-
TARY FORCES, AND A GROWING CAPACITY TO PROJECT MILITARY

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POWER TO DISTANT PLACES.

6. THE THIRTY YEARS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II HAVE
EVIDENCED GREAT CHANGE IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. FROM
1945 TO 1949, WE HAD A MONOPOLY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FROM
1949 TO ABOUT 1966 WE POSSESSED AN OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY
IN THESE WEAPONS. THUS, FOR THE FIRST TWO DECADES OF THE
POST-WAR PERIOD WE COULD DRAW A CERTAIN COMFORT FROM OUR

STRATEGIC POSITION, ALTHOUGH EVEN THEN ITS PRECISE UTILITY
IN CRISES DEPENDED SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE LOCAL BALANCE OF
FORCES. SINCE THE MID-SIXTIES THERE HAS EMERGED A BASIC
EQUILIBRIUM IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, PLACING A GREATER PRE-
MIUM ON FORCES FOR LOCAL CONFLICT.

7. IN THIS SITUATION, DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY ARE NOT IN
COMPETITION WITH EACH OTHER; THEY ARE MUTUALLY REINFORC-
ING. THE GOAL OF DIPLOMACY IS TO MANAGE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST AMONG SOVEREIGN STATES AND TO HELP DEVELOP AREAS
OF HARMONY AND COOPERATION. DEFENSE POLICY IS DESIGNED
TO GIVE DIPLOMACY THE WEIGHT THAT MAKES IT FEASIBLE TO
ACHIEVE THESE GOALS IN A COMPETITIVE AND DIVERSE WORLD
WHICH, IN MILITARY TERMS, CONTINUES TO BE DOMINATED BY
THE BIPOLAR RIVALRY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
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SOVIET UNION.

8. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE DIPLOMACY CANNOT BE A SUB-
STITUTE FOR DEFENSE. THE MANNER IN WHICH MILITARY FORCES
ARE DEPLOYED IS UNDOUBTEDLY A FUNCTION OF PARTICULAR DAN-
GERS, WHICH MAY CHANGE OVER TIME AND SPACE. BUT THE
NECESSITY TO HAVE, AND BE SEEN AND BELIEVED TO HAVE, THE
CAPACITY TO APPLY THE ULTIMATE SANCTION IN DEFENSE OF
ONE'S INTERESTS REMAINS UNAVOIDABLE. AND NOT ONLY THE
RAW CAPACITY, BUT THE WILL AND THE DECISION MECHANISMS
THAT GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THAT WILL.

9. IN OUR SYSTEM OF DIVIDED POWER BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND

CONGRESS, THIS REQUIRES A NEW CONSENSUS AND A NEW BALANCE
OF AUTHORITY SO THAT ENDLESS DEBATES OVER PRIORITIES DO
NOT PARALYZE US IN THE FACE OF DANGER. OUR DEMOCRACY RE-
QUIRES "GREAT DEBATES" CONCERNING OUR PROPER ROLE IN A
CHANGING WORLD. BUT DEBATE MUST SOONER OR LATER LEAD TO
DECISION OR THE WORLD WILL PASS US BY.

10. NO ONE IS MORE CONSCIOUS OF SHORTFALLS IN EITHER
CAPACITY OR WILL FOR DEFENSE THAN THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY IT IS TO REPRESENT THE NATION'S

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INTERESTS IN THE WORLD AT LARGE. FOR, LONG BEFORE A POTEN-
TIAL ADVERSARY MIGHT RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST US,
HE MAY SEEK TO INFRINGE ON OUR INTERESTS IN OTHER WAYS.
FRIENDS, ALLIES AND OTHERS ADJUST THEMSELVES TO REAL AND
PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF POWER. THIS IS NOT TO
SAY THAT DIPLOMACY WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE BRILLIANT, FAR-
SEEING AND WISE IF IT IS BACKED BY A STRONG DEFENSE ESTAB-
LISHMENT. BUT IT IS TO SAY THAT WITHOUT A STRONG DEFENSE
ESTABLISHMENT, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN OUR ERA WOULD LABOR
UNDER A MOST SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE. THIS WOULD BE THE CASE
EVEN WERE WE TO SUCCEED IN REMOVING OR ALLEVIATING A PAR-
TICULAR CRISIS SITUATION AND AS WE ENLARGE AREAS OF CO-
OPERATION WITH POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES.

1. FOR WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT AS LONG AS CONFLICTING
VALUES AND INTERESTS EXIST, SUCCESSFUL DIPLOMACY MUST REST

ON A SENSE OF SECURITY, ON AN ESSENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM OF
FORCES AND ON AN UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH THE BENEFITS OF
RESTRAINT AND THE PENALTIES THAT WOULD ATTEND THE LACK OF
RESTRAINT. IT REMAINS A REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
IN OUR ERA THAT INTERESTS WILL BE RESPECTED ONLY IF THEY
CAN BE DEFENDED, IF NECESSARY, BY FORCE. INDEED AS LONG
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AS IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT INTERESTS CAN AND WILL BE DEFEND-
ED BY FORCE, IT REMAINS POSSIBLE TO DEFEND THEM BY MEANS
SHORT OF FORCE.

12. IN SUM, IT IS THE EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES PRODUCED BY
AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT THAT PERMITS THE USE OF
NON-MILITARY MEANS TO PROTECT AND ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS.
AND IT IS THE COMPLEX AND EVER-EXPANDING INTERPLAY OF
POLITICAL ACTIONS THAT CAN PRODUCE THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS
AND INTERDEPENDENCIES THAT BUILD CONSTRAINTS AGAINST THE
USE OF FORCE. NONE OF THIS DEPENDS ON "GOOD FAITH" OR
"HOPEFUL" ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE INTENTIONS OF POTEN-
TIAL ADVERSARIES.

13. BUT IT DOES DEPEND ON CREATING AND MAINTAINING A
CALCULUS OF BENEFITS AND RISKS THAT WILL MAKE RESTRAINT
AND RESPONSIBLE USES OF POWER THE RATIONAL CHOICE OF
POLITICAL LEADERS.

14. NOW WE FIND THAT GREAT ATTENTION IS DEVOTED TO THE
MARGIN WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT EXIST BETWEEN OUR STRATEGIC
FORCES AND THOSE OF THE SOVIETS. THERE IS A GENUINE QUES-

TION WHETHER THESE ILLUSIVE MARGINAL EDGES IN STRATEGIC

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POWER THREATEN TO OUTSTRIP RATIONAL OBJECTIVES. IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE, THE PERILS OF USING FORCE ARE NOT NECESSARILY
IN REASONABLE PROPORTION TO THE OBJECTIVES WHICH MIGHT BE
SOUGHT IF NUCLEAR STRENGTH IS EQUATED SIMPLY TO CONVEN-
TIONAL STRENGTH.

15. MARGINAL DIFFERENCES OR ADVANTAGES IN STRATEGIC
FORCES ARE NOT READILY TRANSLATABLE INTO MEANINGFUL MILI-
TARY STRENGTH. SUCH MARGINAL DIFFERENCES BECOME SIGNI-
FICANT ONLY IF THEY GIVE RISE TO A POLITICAL PERCEPTION
THAT ONE SIDE HAS ACQUIRED A GENUINE UNILATERAL EDGE. THE
IMPACT OF SUCH POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS WILL BE HEIGHTENED
IF WE IN THIS COUNTRY RAISE SUCH A MARGIN TO A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ADVANTAGE. I WOULD NOTE IN PASSING THAT THE SOVIETS
ARE NOT LARGER THAN LIFE. IN THE HIGH TECHNOLOGY AREA
OF THE SPACE PROGRAM -- IN WHICH THE SOVIETS LED AT THE
TIME OF SPUTNIK -- WE CAN OBSERVE THAT SEVEN YEARS AFTER
WE PUT MEN ON THE MOON THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO DUPLICATE
THAT ACCOMPLISHMENT.

16. ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITA-
TIONS NEGOTIATIONS IS TO PUT THE STRATEGIC EQUATION INTO
LONG-TERM EQUILIBRIUM, AT LEAST AS FAR AS NUMBERS OF
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WEAPONS ARE CONCERNED. IF WE CAN DO THIS WE MAY BE ABLE

TO PREVENT MARGINAL DIFFERENCES IN THE STRATEGIC FORCES
FROM MESMERIZING OR HYPNOTIZING SOME INTO A MISCONCEIVED
VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. SUCH MISCONCEPTIONS CAN
DIMINISH OUR CAPACITY TO DETER THE USE OF FORCE BY CAST-
ING DOUBT ON THE ADEQUACY OF OUR STRATEGIC FORCES.

17. THE OVERRIDING PURPOSE OF OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE IS
POLITICAL AND DEFENSIVE: TO DENY OUR ADVERSARIES THE
ABILITY TO IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES.
OUR STRATEGIC FORCES NOW -- AND, GIVEN OUR PROGRAMS, IN
THE YEARS AHEAD -- WILL BE ADEQUATE FOR THIS PURPOSE. IN
THE DEFENSE BUDGET PRESENTLY BEFORE THE CONGRESS, THE
ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE PROVISION FOR MODEST GROWTH IN BOTH
OUR STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THIS MUST BE DONE
TO REVERSE THE TREND DURING WHICH WE HAVE SEEN OUR DEFENSE
BUDGET SHRINK IN REAL TERMS IN THE FACE OF INFLATION. UN-
DER THE PROPOSED BUDGET WE WILL CONTINUE OUR POLICY OF
STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY AND RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO IMPROVE
OUR FORCES IF ARMS CONTROL FAILS OR IS DELAYED.

18. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY IS NOT NARROWLY

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BASED ON DEBATABLE CALCULATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF HOW A WAR MIGHT OCCUR AND BE CON-
DUCTED. IT IS IN PART A POLITICAL CONCEPT AND INVOLVES
JUDGMENTS AS TO WHETHER THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT -- NOW OR
IN THE FUTURE -- MAY ENDANGER OUR INTERESTS. WE NEED,

THEREFORE, A CLEAR CONCEPTION OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS
AND SUPPORT FOR OUR GOVERNMENT TO EXECUTE OUR POLICY. WITH-
OUT THAT SUPPORT WE CANNOT MAINTAIN THE CONSTANCY OF PUR-
POSE AND RESOLVE WHICH IS ESSENTIAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
AND IN THE FACE OF COMPETITION INTO THE INDEFINITE FUTURE.

"

19. WE MUST CONDUCT OUR FOREIGN POLICY WITH OUR PERMANENT
INTERESTS IN MIND AND WORK TOWARD AN EQUILIBRIUM. WHETHER
WE DO THAT IN THE NAME OF DETENTE OR UNDER SOME OTHER
NAME IS UNIMPORTANT. RATHER WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE PRI-
MACY OF THE GOAL -- EQUILIBRIUM -- RATHER THAN THE TACTICS.

20. IF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE CONTINUES WITHOUT CONSTR-
INT, WE RUN THE RISK THAT MORE OF OUR RESOURCES WILL BE PUT
INTO AN UNPRODUCTIVE -- PERHAPS UNUSABLE -- AREA. THROUGH-
OUT HISTORY AS NATIONS INCREASED THEIR MILITARY POSTURE,
SUCH INCREASES CARRIED WITH THEM THE IMPLICATION OF IN-

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CREASED POLITICAL POWER BASED ON THE IMPLICIT THREAT THAT
MILITARY POWER COULD BE USED. INCREMENTAL ADDITIONS TO
THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THAT EFFECT
AS NO GOVERNMENT CAN THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR POWER LIGHTLY.

21. IN THE NUCLEAR AGE WE FACE UNPARALLELED RESPONSIBI-
LITY TO TRY TO AVOID THE WORLD CATASTROPHE THAT WILL RE-
SULT FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A MASSIVE EX-
CHANG:. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT WE SHOULD RELY SOLELY
ON DETERRENCE. WE MUST PLAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES

INVOLVING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT, INDEED,
WILL MAKE DETERRENCE ITSELF MORE EFFECTIVE. BUT THE BASIC
REASON FOR OUR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IS TO DETER SITU-
ATIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

22. IF THE STRATEGIC ARMS PROGRAMS CONTINUE AT HIGHER
LEVELS, WE WILL HAVE USED RESOURCES WHICH ARE NEEDED
ELSEWHERE. WE DO NOT FACE ONLY THE SPECTRE OF NUCLEAR
WAR. THOUGH OUR GOAL IS PEACE AND EQUILIBRIUM, WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT, A MORE LIKELY CON-
TINGENCY THAN NUCLEAR WAR. FOR THIS WE NEED STRONG CON-
VENTIONAL FORCES -- SHIPS, PLANES, AND GROUND WEAPONS.

IF WE ARE FORCED TO SPEND ADDITIONAL BILLIONS FOR STRATE-
GIC ARMS, WE FACE THE DANGER OF DENYING OURSELVES THE
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CONVENTIONAL FORCES WE NEED, WHILE ADDING FURTHER TO AN
ARSENAL WHICH WE HOPE WILL NEVER BE USED.

23. NO ONE HAS YET DEvised A CREDIBLE SCENARIO FOR A
FIRST STRIKE WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NO LEADER COULD BE
UNCONSCIOUS OF THE TERRIBLE RISK OF RETALIATION HE AND
HIS NATION WOULD FACE. THUS WE ARE DETERMINED THAT OUR
STRATEGIC ARSENAL WILL SERVE ITS PURPOSE OF DETERRENCE AND
REMAIN ADEQUATE AND READY -- AND UNUSED.

24. AS WE SEEK TO CAP THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AND OPEN
THE WAY TO REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARSENALS, WE ARE MIND-
FUL OF THE NEED FOR STRONG CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES. IF SALT
SUCCEEDS, WE HOPE TO BUILD A BASIS FOR AN EQUILIBRIUM
WHICH WILL ALLOW US TO FACE THE PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY

WHICH WILL ALWAYS BE WITH US.

25. WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION. GIVEN
ITS IDEOLOGY, COMPETITION IS INEVITABLE. IN COMBINATION
WITH OUR FRIENDS WE CAN HAVE THE RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN THE
COMPETITIVE BALANCE.

26. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS A COMPLEX ONE. BUT IT IS
;
NOT DETENTE WHICH MAKES POSSIBLE A SOVIET INTERVENTION
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IN ANGOLA, IT IS SOVIET STRENGTH AND OUR FAILURE TO RE-
SIST. BUT THIS IS A MATTER OF OUR WILL AND OUR SENSE OF
PRIORITIES, NOT THE RESULT OF SOME INEVITABLE DECLINE OR
REAL IMBALANCE OF FORCES.

27. WE MUST BE IN A POSITION TO ACT OURSELVES WHEN THE
NEED ARISES. WE CANNOT MERELY RAIL AT OUR ADVERSARIES OR
RETURN TO NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AND BRINKMANSHIP. INSTEAD
WE MUST DRAW ON OUR ASSETS -- MORAL AND MATERIAL -- TO
FACE THE PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVOTE TO THEM
THE RESOURCES WE NEED.

28. WE NEED, THEREFORE, STRONG CONVENTIONAL FORCES. WE
MUST HAVE THE TACTICAL FORCES WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO KEEP
THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD HIGH. NO PRESIDENT SHOULD BE FACED
WITH THE DILEMMA OF RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR INACTION
AS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES IN THE FACE OF THREATS. IN NO
RECENT CRISIS HAS AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT COME CLOSE TO
USING OUR NUCLEAR FORCES. RATHER IT IS TO OUR CON-
VENTIONAL FORCES THAT WE MUST BE ABLE TO LOOK FIRST IN TIME

OF NEED.

29. LET ME SPEAK NOW OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ALL

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TO OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE -- OUR CHARACTER AND MORAL PUR-

POSE. WE HAVE EMERGED FROM THE DIVISENESS AND DISCORD OF

THE LAST DECADE WHICH AROSE FROM OUR INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH-

EAST ASIA. OUR DUTY NOW IS TO RECOGNIZE THAT IF PEACE IS

OUR AIM, WE MUST BE STRONG AND UNITED. TO REALIZE OUR GOAL,

WE MUST AVOID CYNICISM AND SIMPLE FORMULAE. THE WORLD

IS COMPLEX. OUR FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE SOPHISTICATED TO

DEAL WITH IT. THERE ARE FEW SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE

CHOICES ARE CLEAR CUT, THE DIRECTIONS UNASSAILABLY APPA-

RENT. THUS WE MUST APPROACH OUR FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

WITH CAUTION AND REASONED ANALYSIS. WE MUST CONSIDER

ESPECIALLY THE IMPACT OF OUR ACTIONS TODAY ON THE WORLD

OF FIVE, TEN AND FIFTEEN YEARS FROM NOW.

30. WE CANNOT AVOID INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY. WE

CANNOT IGNORE THE THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES THAT WILL IN-

EVITABLY ARISE. IN THESE SITUATIONS THERE WILL BE NUANCES

AND CLOSE JUDGMENTS. IN OUR SEARCH FOR THE RIGHT COURSE

WE MUST NOT LET THE BEST DRIVE OUT THE GOOD.

31. AT THE OUTSET TODAY I SAID THAT AMERICA IS STRONG.

IT IS. LET US BUILD ON THAT STRENGTH IN THE PURSUIT OF

PEACE. LET US KEEP OUR EYES OPEN FOR OPPORTUNITY AND NOT

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AVERT OUR EYES FROM DANGER. WITH OUR HERITAGE OF FREEDOM
FOR EVERY MAN AND OUR HISTORY OF RESPONDING TO CHALLENGE,
WE CAN FACE OUR ROLE IN THE WORLD WITH THE SAME CONFIDENCE
WHICH AMERICANS DISPLAYED A CENTURY AGO IN THEIR PIONEERING
EFFORTS TO OPEN THE AMERICAN WEST. WITH SLIM MEANS, GREAT
COURAGE, AND PERSEVERANCE, THE PIONEERS PUSHED FORWARD
OUR FRONTIER ACROSS THE CONTINENT AND FORGED A CIVILIZATION
FROM THE WILDERNESS. WE CAN EMULATE THEIR COURAGE AND
MORAL PURPOSE IN OUR RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE OF INTER-
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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